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Abstract
We examine whether and how rainfall shocks a¤ect tari¤ setting in the agricultural
sector. In a model of international oligopoly, we show that the impact of a negative
rainfall shock on optimal import tari¤s is generally ambiguous, depending on the
weight placed by the domestic policy maker on tari¤ revenue, prots and the consumer
surplus. The more weight placed on domestic prots, the more likely it is that the
policy maker will respond to a rainfall shortage by reducing import tari¤s. Using
detailed panel data on applied tari¤s and rainfall for 70 nations, we nd that rainfall
shortages generally induce policy makers to set lower tari¤s on agricultural imports.
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"...drought [in "rice countries"] is, perhaps, scarce ever so universal as neces-
sarily to occasion a famine, if the government would allow a free trade."Adam
Smith (1776, IV.5.45)
1 Introduction
Recent empirical research suggests that greater openness to trade mitigates the impacts of
weather shocks on hunger and death. Using district-level panel data for colonial India in
1875-1919, and exploiting the construction of the railroad network to identify the e¤ects of
increased openness, Burgess and Donaldson (2011) document that the arrival of railroads
dramatically constrained the ability of rainfall shortages to cause famine.1 But while this
evidence points to the existence of a causal link between openness and weather-related
famine, import tari¤s on agricultural goods remain high in many nations, and relatively
little is known about the extent to which countries use trade policy strategically to mitigate
the impacts of weather shocks on domestic welfare.2
In this paper, we examine whether and how rainfall shortages a¤ect tari¤ setting in
the agricultural sector. To identify key mechanisms at play, we rst set up a model of
international oligopoly in which domestic and foreign agricultural producers compete in
the home market. International trade is potentially costly due to import tari¤s optimally
set by the domestic policy maker. A rainfall shortage increases the marginal costs of
domestic producers, thus generating a shortfall in food output that foreign producers have
an incentive to meet. Consequently, the shock a¤ects the marginal e¤ects of import tari¤s
on tari¤ revenue, domestic prots and the consumer surplus, and thereby the optimal
policy response.
We nd that the impact of a rainfall shock on optimal import tari¤s is not clear-
cut. A rainfall shortage leads to a higher volume of agricultural imports and therefore
higher marginal tari¤ revenues. All else equal, this increases the optimal tari¤. On the
other hand, by making home production more costly, the shock reduces incentives for
using tari¤s as an instrument to shift rents from foreign to domestic producers. This
leads, ceteris paribus, to a lower optimal tari¤. Finally, a rainfall shortage also reduces
domestic consumerssurplus due to a lower total supply of food. This reduces (increases)
the negative e¤ect of import tari¤s on domestic consumers if food demand is not too
(su¢ ciently) convex, leading, all else equal, to higher (lower) tari¤s. The overall impact of
the rainfall shock on optimal import tari¤s is, therefore, generally ambiguous, depending
1This evidence is consistent with Donaldson (2010), who shows that railroads contributed to reduce the
exposure of agricultural prices and real incomes to rainfall shocks.
2Gibson et al. (2001) emphasize that high protection for agricultural commodities in the form of tari¤s
continues to be the major factor restricting world trade.
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on the weight placed by the domestic policy maker on each of these policy objectives, and
on the shape of the food demand function. A larger weight placed on domestic prots
will enlarge the scope for a rainfall shortage to cause tari¤ reductions. A stronger concern
for domestic consumers may have a similar e¤ect, but only if food demand is su¢ ciently
convex, i.e., if the demand for food becomes su¢ ciently inelastic at lower consumption
levels.
We proceed by estimating the e¤ect of rainfall shocks on e¤ectively applied tari¤s.
Using detailed panel data on applied tari¤s and rainfall for 70 nations over the period
1988-2006, we nd that rainfall shortages generally lead to lower applied tari¤s on agricul-
tural imports. This result is found to be robust across various econometric specications,
suggesting that governments around the world use trade policy strategically in response
to rainfall shocks.
In addition to the work cited above, our paper is related to the theoretical and empir-
ical literature on strategic trade policy, including Bickerdike (1907), Graaf (19491950),
Dixit (1984), Eaton and Grossman (1986), Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995), Bran-
der (1985), Gawande et al. (2000), Broda et al. (2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (2012a,
b). We are not aware of previous research, either theoretical or empirical, focusing on
the e¤ects of rainfall shocks on optimal tari¤s in the agricultural sector. Our work is
also broadly related to the emerging literature on how weather shocks shape economic,
social and political outcomes (Deschênes and Greenstone, 2007; Maccini and Yang, 2009;
Burgess et al., 2009; Brückner et al, 2011; Dell et al, 2011).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical
model in which rainfall shocks impact on the optimal agricultural tari¤s set by the domestic
policy maker. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy, while section 4 presents the data
employed in the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents the main results, before section 6
examines their robustness. Section 7 concludes.
2 Amodel of weather shocks and optimal agricultural tari¤s
Consider an oligopolistic domestic market for a homogeneous agricultural good that is
supplied by n domestic and m foreign producers.3 Domestic demand for the agricultural
good is given by the inverse demand function
p = 1 Q; (1)
3 It is common to adopt oligopoly models to investigate international trade in agricultural markets.
Early theoretical and empirical research in this literature includes Sarris and Freebairn (1983), Karp and
McCalla (1983), Kolstad and Burris (1986), Paaarlberg and Abbott (1986) and Pick and Park (1991).
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where
Q =
nX
i=1
qi +
mX
j=1
bqj (2)
is total supply of the good, with qi and bqj being quantities supplied by the domestic
producer i and the foreign producer j, respectively.4 There is a constant marginal cost of
production equal to c (bc) for domestic (foreign) producers. In addition, foreign producers
must pay a per-unit tari¤ t for supplying the domestic market. This tari¤ is set by a
domestic policy maker with the following objective function:

 = T + 
nX
i=1
i + S; (3)
where
T = t
mX
j=1
bqj (4)
is total tari¤ revenue,
i = (p  c) qi (5)
is the prot of the domestic producer i, and
S =
1
2
Q2 (6)
is domestic consumerssurplus. The specication of 
 is su¢ ciently general to encompass
a variety of di¤erent policy objectives, where we allow the policy maker to place di¤erent
weights on domestic prots and consumerssurplus:  2 [0; 1] and  2 [0; 1], respectively.
The prot of a foreign producer j is given by
bj = (p  bc  t) bqj : (7)
We consider the following two-stage game:
Stage 1: The domestic policy maker sets the import tari¤ t.
Stage 2: The domestic and foreign producers choose quantities simultaneously and non-
cooperatively.
We look for a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, solving the model by backwards
induction.
4We adopt the simplifying assumption of linear demand in order to identify key mechanisms whereby
a rainfall shortage shapes tari¤ setting incentives. Below we examine the implications of considering
alternative specications for food demand, and discuss their empirical relevance.
4
2.1 Equilibrium food supply
Each producer chooses its supply of the agricultural good to maximize its prots. The
rst-order conditions for a domestic and foreign producer, respectively, are given by
@i
@qi
= 1  2qi  
 
nX
k=1
qk   qi
!
 
mX
j=1
bqj   c = 0 (8)
and
@bj
@bqj = 1  2bqj  
 
mX
s=1
bqs   bqj!  nX
i=1
qi   bc  t = 0: (9)
Applying symmetry, qi = qk = q and bqj = bqs = bq, the Nash equilibrium output of domestic
and foreign producers, respectively, are given by
q =
1  (m+ 1) c+m (bc+ t)
m+ n+ 1
(10)
and bq = 1  (n+ 1) (bc+ t) + nc
m+ n+ 1
: (11)
Total output is therefore
Q =
n (1  c) +m (1  bc  t)
m+ n+ 1
; (12)
which gives a domestic market price
p =
1 + nc+m (bc+ t)
m+ n+ 1
: (13)
Prots of domestic and foreign producers are given by  = q2 and b = bq2, respectively.
2.2 Optimal import tari¤
At the rst stage of the game, the domestic policy maker chooses the import tari¤, t, to
maximize its objective function, given by (3). The optimal tari¤ is implicitly given by
@

@t
=
@T
@t
+ n
@
@t
+ 
@S
@t
= 0; (14)
and explicitly given by5
t =
"
(1  bc+ n (c  bc)) (m+ n+ 1) + 2n (1  c m (c  bc))
  (m (1  bc) + n (1  c))
#
2 (n+ 1) (m+ n+ 1)  (2n+ )m : (15)
5The second-order condition,
@2

@t2
=  m

2 (n+ 1) (m+ n+ 1)  (2n+ )m
(m+ n+ 1)2

< 0;
is satised for all  2 [0; 1] and  2 [0; 1]. This implies that the denominator in (15) is positive.
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The optimal tari¤ balances three di¤erent policy concerns: (i) raising tari¤ revenues,
(ii) shifting oligopoly rents from foreign to domestic producers, and (iii) increasing con-
sumers surplus. Notice that more rent shifting and an increase in consumers surplus
are conicting policy targets. Thus, a larger weight on domestic prots leads to a higher
optimal tari¤,
@t
@
=

2n (m+ n+ 1)
2 (n+ 1) (m+ n+ 1)  (2n+ )m

q (t) > 0; (16)
while a larger weight on consumerssurplus leads to a lower optimal tari¤,
@t
@
=  

(m+ n+ 1)
2 (n+ 1) (m+ n+ 1)  (2n+ )m

Q (t) < 0: (17)
2.3 Rainfall shortage
A negative rainfall shock makes agricultural production more expensive. We model a
domestic rainfall shortage as an increase in the marginal cost of domestic production, c.
The e¤ect on the optimal tari¤ can be summarized as follows:6
Proposition 1 (i) A domestic rainfall shortage leads to a higher import tari¤ if  is
su¢ ciently low.
(ii) A domestic rainfall shortage leads to a lower import tari¤ if  is su¢ ciently high
and n is su¢ ciently low relative to m.
(iii) The lower is , the larger is the parameter space for which a domestic rainfall
shortage leads to a lower import tari¤.
Proof. (i) From (15) we have
@t
@c
= n

m+ n+ 1 +    2 (m+ 1)
2 (n+ 1) (m+ n+ 1)  (2n+ )m

; (18)
which is positive for a su¢ ciently low value of . (ii) From (18) we see that
@t
@c
< 0 if  >  :=
m+ n+  + 1
2 (m+ 1)
;
where  < 1 if n < m + 1   . (iii) Since  is increasing in , a lower  increases the
parameter space dened by  > .
For a given level of the import tari¤, a domestic rainfall shortage, by increasing the
domestic cost of agricultural production, leads to lower market shares for domestic pro-
ducers. Although some of the fall in domestic production is replaced by increased imports,
6We evaluate the e¤ect of a domestic rainfall shortage by considering a marginal increase in the domestic
cost of agricultural production. However, it can easily be shown that the e¤ect on the optimal tari¤ is
qualitatively identical if we instead consider a discrete increase in marginal production costs.
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there will also be a reduction in the total supply of food to the domestic market. Thus,
domestic producers as well as consumers are hurt by a negative rainfall shock. Since do-
mestic producers (consumers) would su¤er (benet) from a lower import tari¤, it might
seem somewhat counterintuitive that a lower import tari¤ can be an optimal policy re-
sponse to a rainfall shortage only if the policy maker places a su¢ ciently large weight on
domestic prots, and that the scope for such a policy response is larger the less weight
the policy maker places on consumerssurplus. The intuition for this result, though, can
be found by considering how a domestic cost increase a¤ects the policy makers trade-o¤
among its three di¤erent policy targets. These are given by the three terms in (14), and
we will consider each of the three di¤erent policy targets in turn.
(i) The e¤ect of using import tari¤s to raise tax revenues is given by
@T
@t
= m
bq + t@bq
@t

= m
bq   t n+ 1
m+ n+ 1

: (19)
An increase in domestic production costs leads to a higher import volume (since bq is
increasing in c) and therefore higher marginal tari¤ revenues. All else equal, this increases
the optimal tari¤.
(ii) The e¤ect of using import tari¤s to shift oligopoly rents from foreign to domestic
producers is given by
@
@t
=
@p
@t
q + (p  c) @q
@t
=

2m
m+ n+ 1

q: (20)
An increase in domestic production costs reduces domestic output and price-cost margins
(notice that p   c = q in equilibrium), which in turn reduces the marginal rent-shifting
e¤ect of import tari¤s. In other words, import tari¤s become less e¤ective as a rent-
shifting instrument if domestic producers become more cost-disadvantaged. All else equal,
this reduces the optimal tari¤ and, naturally, the e¤ect is stronger the larger weight the
policy maker places on domestic prots.
(iii) The e¤ect of using import tari¤s to increase domestic consumerssurplus is given
by
@S
@t
= Q

n
@q
@t
+m
@bq
@t

=  

m
m+ n+ 1

Q: (21)
An increase in domestic production costs reduces total supply of food in the domestic mar-
ket. If consumerssurplus is convex in output, which is true for linear demand functions,
this means that the reduction in consumerssurplus due to a marginal tari¤ increase is
lower. All else equal, this increases the optimal tari¤ and, naturally, the e¤ect is stronger
the larger weight the policy maker places on consumerssurplus.
Thus, we can conclude that the policy maker will optimally respond to a domestic
rainfall shortage by lowering import tari¤s if the second of the three above described e¤ects
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the reduced e¤ectiveness of import tari¤s as a rent-shifting instrument is su¢ ciently
strong to outweigh the other two e¤ects. Otherwise, the import tari¤ will increase.
The above analysis is based on the simplifying assumption of linear demand. Although
the main mechanisms of the model, as given by the three di¤erent e¤ects described above,
generalize well beyond the assumption of linear demand, it is worth considering the extent
to which our results are robust to alternative demand assumptions. In particular, the result
that a tari¤ increase has a larger negative impact on consumers at higher consumption
levels relies on the assumption that consumerssurplus is convex in output. For a general
inverse demand function p (Q), this requires that
p0 (Q) +Qp00 (Q) < 0:
In other words, consumerssurplus is convex in output for concave, linear and not-too-
convex demand functions. However, since demand for food is likely to become quite
inelastic for low consumption levels, consumerssurplus might be concave in output for
the range of output levels that are relevant for rainfall shortages that cause a serious
cut-back in domestic production.7 If this is the case, a rainfall shortage will increase the
negative e¤ect of import tari¤s on consumerssurplus, thereby increasing the scope for
tari¤ reductions as an optimal response to a negative rainfall shock.
3 Empirical strategy
To estimate the impact of rainfall shocks on applied import tari¤s we adopt the following
econometric specication:
ln tari¤ict = +  ln rainct +  ln rainct  agrici + i +  c +  t + ict; (22)
where tari¤ict is the import tari¤ e¤ectively applied on product i by country c in year t;
rainct is the amount of rainfall recorded in country c in year t; agrici is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one for agricultural products; i is an industry xed-e¤ect,  c is a
country xed-e¤ect and  t is a year xed-e¤ect. ict is an idiosyncratic error term.
Our main interest lies on , which reveals whether and how countries use trade policy
strategically to mitigate the adverse e¤ects of rainfall shortages on the agricultural sector.
7 In empirical studies, demand for food is generally found to be inelastic (Andreyeva et. al. 2010).
OHare and Kammen (2008) argue that it seems reasonable to assume that demand for food becomes less
and less elastic as agricultural output declines. As food consumption falls, consequences like malnutrition
and starvation begin to appear, impacts much more compelling than the hedonic costs of consuming a
less-preferred diet or wasting less food. Consistent with this hypothesis, Andreyeva et. al. (2010) survey
a large body of evidence on the price elasticity of demand for food and conclude that demand is relatively
more elastic for categories like "food away from home", "soft drinks" and "juice".
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Conditional on industry and year xed-e¤ects, identication of the causal e¤ect of interest
relies on the plausible assumption that within-country variation in rainfall over time is
orthogonal to other determinants of import tari¤s.
4 Data
Our empirical analysis makes use of the following sets of data:
1. Import tari¤s We use panel data on applied import tari¤s by country and product
(SITC 2-dig., Rev. 4) from the TRAINS database from the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development. These data are generally available from 1988
onwards, but the extent of time coverage di¤ers considerably across countries. We
use both simple and import-weighted tari¤s. The latter are dened as the weighted
average of tari¤s applied on imports from the various source countries, where the
weights are the share of each country in total product imports in a base period.
Imports data (also by product-country) come from the United Nations Commodity
Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE).
2. Rainfall We draw on annual data on rainfall levels by country-year. These data
come from the Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precipitation: 1900-2006 gridded
monthly time series, compiled by Kenji Matsuura and Cort Willmott in conjunction
with NASA.8
We combine these sets of data to construct an unbalanced panel at the product-country
level, covering 70 nations over the period 1988-2006. Table A.1 in the appendix summarizes
the data sources and variable denitions. To ensure adequate coverage for each country,
we excluded information for nations that do not have at least three consecutive years
of tari¤ and rainfall data. Table A.2 lists the countries and corresponding time periods
covered in our sample, while Table A.3 details the product classication we employ. To
identify agricultural products we use the UN statistics division of the SITC classication.
For robustness, we also consider a broader denition that includes as well other food
products.9
Figure 1 provides illustrative evidence on the rainfall variable we employ for a subset of
countries. The dashed lines in these diagrams refer to major, widely-documented droughts
observed in each nation. Many of these extreme weather events were associated with the
El Niño or La Niña phenomena, including Argentina (1999), Bolivia (1998), Brazil (1998,
8These data are also used (and made available online) by Dell et al. (2011).
9As shown in Table A.3, this latter denition includes as well SITC product categories "08", "09", "11",
"12" and "29".
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2003), Colombia (1992, 1997), Chile (1998), Costa Rica (2001), Guatemala (1997, 2001)
and Peru (2000).
[Figure 1 about here]
Our theory applies to countries that have discretion to set import tari¤s on agricultural
goods. A potential concern is that, in reality, tari¤ setting might be constraint by limits
associated with GATT/WTO membership. As shown in Figure 2, however, countries
typically set their tari¤s on agricultural goods well below the bound tari¤s imposed by
such multilateral tari¤ agreements; see Gibson et. al (2001, pp. 20-21) for further data
and discussion. This implies that policy makers have ample policy space to adjust tari¤s
strategically in response to rainfall shortages.
[Figure 2 about here]
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the nal panel data set employed in the regres-
sion analysis. As can be seen, most observations refer to developing countries in Latin
America and Caribbean, Asia-Pacic and Africa.
[Table 1 about here]
5 Main results
Table 2 reports our baseline results. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimates obtained
using a simple average of import tari¤s as the dependent variable, while columns (3) and
(4) report results from using weighted tari¤s. By denition, the former measures give
equal weights to all bilateral applied tari¤s within each importer-product pair. They are
therefore less sensitive to potential bias arising from the fact that a higher tari¤ imposed
on a given source country may lead to zero or little equilibrium imports from that nation.
The latter measures have the advantage of placing a larger weight on tari¤s imposed on
countries for which import volumes of that product are larger to begin with. If such dif-
ferential import shares reect heterogeneity in fundamentals across source countries (e.g.,
due to stronger comparative advantage in agriculture), the policy maker may optimally
favor larger adjustments to import tari¤s imposed on major food exporters, so as to obtain
larger impacts from the policy response. It is therefore important to use both measures.
[Table 2 about here]
The estimates reported in columns (1) and (3) of Table 2 shows no signicant e¤ects
of rainfall shocks on overall import tari¤s. This result is not surprising, considering that
rainfall shortages would not be expected to a¤ect tari¤ setting in the non-agricultural
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sector, and that food represents a relatively small proportion of the full spectrum of
products. Columns (2) and (4) point, however, to signicant impacts of rainfall shocks on
import tari¤s of agricultural products: the coe¢ cient of interest is positive and statistically
signicant at the 1% level, suggesting that a rainfall shortage induces policy makers to set
lower tari¤s on agricultural imports.
6 Robustness
We conduct a number of checks to verify the robustness of our empirical ndings. First, we
examine the extent to which the results are sensitive to composition of our sample. To do
this, we restrict the sample to include only countries that report at least four consecutive
years of tari¤ and rainfall data. This reduces the number of countries in the estimation
sample to 51, down from the 70 initially considered. Reassuringly, the estimates yielded
by this restricted sample remain very similar, both qualitatively and quantitatively (Table
3).
[Table 3 about here]
We proceed by verifying the extent to which the results are sensitive to the denition
of agricultural products we employ. In our baseline analysis, we rely on the UN statistics
division of the SITC classication. For robustness, in Table 4 we consider a broader
denition that includes as well other food products (Table A.3). The results reported in
this table show that our ndings remain very similar when this alternative denition is
used.
[Table 4 about here]
Table 5 reports the estimates obtained when considering this broader denition of
agricultural products and the restricted sample mentioned above. Once again, the results
remain very similar.
[Table 5 about here]
Table 6 reports separate estimates by region. Since our sample comprises a very small
number of jurisdictions in North America and Europe, we report results for countries in
Africa, Latin America and Caribbean and Asia-Pacic. The estimates for the latter two
regions are very similar to those obtained for the full sample. For Africa, however, we
obtain insignicant coe¢ cients on the interaction term of interest.
[Table 6 about here]
Table 7 shows that these conclusions remain generally unchanged when conducting
this regional analysis on the restricted sample. Nevertheless, there are reasons to remain
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cautious in interpreting these insignicant results as evidence that African nations do not
lower import tari¤s strategically in response to rainfall shortages. First, sample size is
considerably smaller for Africa than for the other two regions. Second, when using the
main sample and weighted import tari¤s as the dependent variable, the magnitude of the
coe¢ cient of interest is fairly similar across regions.
[Table 7 about here]
7 Concluding remarks
We have examined the e¤ects of rainfall shocks on tari¤ setting in the agricultural sector.
In a model of international oligopoly, we have shown that the impact of a negative rainfall
shock on optimal tari¤s is generally not clear-cut, depending crucially on the weight placed
by the domestic policy maker on each of the various policy objectives, and on the shape
of the food demand function. We have then estimated the impact of rainfall shocks on
applied tari¤s. Using detailed panel data on applied tari¤s and rainfall for 70 nations, we
have found that rainfall shortages generally lead to lower tari¤s on agricultural imports.
Appendix
[Tables A.1-A.3 about here]
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Figure 1: Rainfall and droughts 
 
 
  
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Average bound and applied import tariffs on agricultural goods 
 
Note: Bound tariffs are MFN rates based on final URAA implementation. Applied tariffs represent annual average. Data on 
average applied import tariffs refer to 1998, with the exception of Costa Rica (1995), Republic of Korea (1996), Indonesia 
(1996), India (1997) and Morocco (1997). Source: Economic Research Service, USDA. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
ln simple tariffs 41,043 2.034 1.221
ln weighted tariffs 40,606 1.582 1.680
ln rain 41,043 2.469 0.757
agric 41,043 0.129 0.335
agric2 41,043 0.209 0.406
North America 41,043 0.046 0.211
Latin America and Caribbean 41,043 0.369 0.482
Europe 41,043 0.053 0.225
Africa 41,043 0.200 0.400
Asia-Pacific 41,043 0.329 0.469
Number of countries 70
Number of products 65
1
Table 2: Baseline estimates
Dep. variable ln simple tariffs ln weighted tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln rainjt 0.064 0.035 0.125 0.082
[0.076] [0.076] [0.094] [0.093]
ln rainjt ∗ agrici 0.230*** 0.338***
[0.047] [0.064]
Observations 41,043 41,043 40,606 40,606
Number of countries 70 70 70 70
Number of products 65 65 65 65
R-squared 0.572 0.574 0.401 0.403
The estimation method is OLS. Each model includes product, country and year fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets. *** p ≤ 0.01 ,**
p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1
2
Table 3: Robustness, restricted sample
Dep. variable ln simple tariffs ln weighted tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln rainjt 0.039 0.006 0.106 0.061
[0.092] [0.091] [0.113] [0.111]
ln rainjt ∗ agrici 0.263*** 0.354***
[0.049] [0.068]
Observations 32,436 32,436 32,117 32,117
Number of countries 51 51 51 51
Number of products 65 65 65 65
R-squared 0.579 0.582 0.415 0.418
The estimation method is OLS. Each model includes product, country and year fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets. *** p ≤ 0.01 ,**
p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1
3
Table 4: Robustness, alternative definition of agricultural goods
Dep. variable ln simple tariffs ln weighted tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln rainjt 0.064 0.015 0.125 0.062
[0.076] [0.074] [0.094] [0.092]
ln rainjt ∗ agrici 0.235*** 0.304***
[0.051] [0.059]
Observations 41,043 41,043 40,606 40,606
Number of countries 70 70 70 70
Number of products 65 65 65 65
R-squared 0.572 0.574 0.401 0.403
The estimation method is OLS. Each model includes product, country and year fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets. *** p ≤ 0.01 ,**
p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1
4
Table 5: Robustness, alternative definition of agricultural goods and restricted sample
Dep. variable ln simple tariffs ln weighted tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln rainjt 0.039 -0.015 0.106 0.040
[0.092] [0.089] [0.113] [0.110]
ln rainjt ∗ agrici 0.261*** 0.317***
[0.056] [0.063]
Observations 32,436 32,436 32,117 32,117
Number of countries 51 51 51 51
Number of products 65 65 65 65
R-squared 0.579 0.583 0.415 0.418
The estimation method is OLS. Each model includes product, country and year fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets. *** p ≤ 0.01 ,**
p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1
5
Table 6: Estimates by region
Panel A ln simple tariffs
LAC Africa Asia-Pacific
ln rainjt 0.142 -0.058 -0.075
[0.095] [0.127] [0.142]
ln rainjt ∗ agrici 0.345*** -0.030 0.303**
[0.076] [0.81] [0.115]
Observations 15,151 8,248 13,512
Number of countries 22 18 23
Number of products 65 65 65
R-squared 0.528 0.611 0.589
Panel B ln weighted tariffs
LAC Africa Asia-Pacific
ln rainjt 0.256* -0.125 -0.113
[0.134] [0.217] [0.183]
ln rainjt ∗ agrici 0.398*** 0.274 0.388**
[0.128] [0.316] [0.155]
Observations 14,969 8,069 13,458
Number of countries 22 18 23
Number of products 65 65 65
R-squared 0.331 0.398 0.448
The estimation method is OLS. Each model includes product, country and
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets.
*** p ≤ 0.01 ,** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1
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Table 7: Estimates by region, restricted sample
Panel A ln simple tariffs
LAC Africa Asia-Pacific
ln rainjt 0.086 -0.134 -0.112
[0.094] [0.159] [0.166]
ln rainjt ∗ agrici 0.324*** -0.026 0.368**
[0.096] [0.220] [0.133]
Observations 12,859 5,295 10,628
Number of countries 18 11 17
Number of products 65 65 65
R-squared 0.511 0.602 0.608
Panel B ln weighted tariffs
LAC Africa Asia-Pacific
ln rainjt 0.201 -0.356 -0.123
[0.155] [0.288] [0.217]
ln rainjt ∗ agrici 0.390** 0.305 0.440**
[0.142] [0.361] [0.183]
Observations 12,690 5,204 10,587
Number of countries 18 11 17
Number of products 65 65 65
R-squared 0.328 0.406 0.466
The estimation method is OLS. Each model includes product, country and
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets.
*** p ≤ 0.01 ,** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1
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Table A.1 Variables and data sources
Variable Definition Source
Rainfall Population weighted average annual
rainfall in mm.
Kenji Matsuura and Cort
Willmott (2007)
Simple Tariffs Simple average of applied import tariffs,
SITC classification
UNCTAD TRAINS
Weighted Tariffs Weighted average of applied import
tariffs based on initial share of each
product-partner in total product im-
ports, SITC classification
UNCTAD TRAINS and UN
COMTRADE
Imports Imports value by product, SITC classi-
fication
UN COMTRADE
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Table A.2 Sample period by country
Country Period Country Period
Algeria 1993, 1997-1998, 2001-2003, 2005-2006 Lesotho 2001, 2004-2006
Argentina 1992-1993, 1995-2006 Macedonia 2001, 2004-2006
Australia 1991, 1993, 1996-2006 Malawi 1994, 1996-1998, 2001, 2006
Bangladesh 1989, 1994,1999-2000, 2002-2006 Malasyia 1988, 1991-1993, 1996-1997, 2001-2003, 2005-2006
Belize 1996, 1999, 2001-2003,2006 Mali 1995, 2001-2006
Benin 2001-2006 Mexico 1991, 1995, 1997-2006
Bolivia 1993-2002, 2004-2006 Morocco 1993, 1997, 2000-2003, 2005-2006
Botswana 2001, 2004-2006 Mozambique 1994, 1997, 2001-2003, 2005-2006
Brazil 1989-2006 Myanmar 2001-2006
Brunei 1992, 2001-2006 Nepal 1993, 1998-2000, 2002-2006
Burkina Faso 1993, 2001-2006 New Zealand 1992-1993, 1996-2000, 2002-2006
Cambodia 2001-2003, 2005 Nicaragua 1995, 1998-2002, 2004-2005
Canada 1989, 1993, 1995-2006 Niger 2001-2006
Chile 1992-1995, 1997-2002, 2004-2006 Nigeria 1988-1990, 1992, 1995-2002, 2005-2006
China 1992-1994, 1996-2001, 2003-2006 Norway 1988, 1993, 1995-1996, 1998, 2000-2003, 2006
Colombia 1991-1992, 1994-1997, 1999-2002, 2004-2006 Pakistan 1995, 1998, 2001-2006
Costa Rica 1995, 1999-2005 Papua New Guinea 1997, 2002-2006
Croatia 2001, 2004-2006 Paraguay 1991, 1994-2006
Cuba 1993, 1997, 2002-2006 Peru 1993, 1995, 1997-2000, 2004-2006
Dominican Republic 1997, 2000-2006 Philippines 1988-1990, 1992-1995, 1998-2006
Ecuador 1993-1999, 2002, 2004-2006 Saudi Arabia 1994, 1999-2000, 2003-2006
El Salvador 1995, 1997-1998, 2000-2002, 2004-2006 Senegal 2001-2006
European Union 1988-2006 South Africa 1990-1991, 1993, 1996-1997, 1999, 2001, 2004-2006
Guatemala 1995, 1997-1998, 2000-2002, 2004-2005 Sri Lanka 1990, 1993-1994, 1997, 2000-2001, 2004-2006
Guyana 1996, 1999-2003, 2006 Switzerland 1990, 1993, 1995-2006
Honduras 1995, 1999-2002, 2004-2005 Taiwan 1989, 1992, 1996, 1999-2003, 2005-2006
Indonesia 1989-1990, 1993, 1995-1996, 1999-2006 Togo 2001-2006
Israel 1993, 2004-2006 Trinidad & Tobago 1991-1992, 1996, 1999, 2001-2003, 2006
Jamaica 1996, 2000-2003, 2006 Tunisia 1990, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2002-2006
Japan 1988-2006 Uganda 1994, 2000-2006
Jordan 2000-2003, 2005-2006 United States 1989-2006
Kenya 1994, 2000-2001, 2004-2006 Uruguay 1992, 1995-2002, 2004-2006
Korea, Republic of 1988-1990, 1992, 1995-1996, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2006 Venezuela 1992, 1995, 1997-2000, 2002, 2004-2006
Laos 2000-2001, 2004-2006 Vietnam 1994, 1999, 2001-2006
Lebanon 1999-2002, 2004-2006 Zimbabwe 1996-1999, 2001-2003
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Table A.3 SITC Classification
SITC Agric Agric2 Description
00 1 1 Live animals other than animals of division 03
01 1 1 Meat and meat preparations
02 1 1 Dairy products and birds eggs
04 1 1 Cereals and cereal preparations
05 1 1 Vegetables and fruit
06 1 1 Sugars, sugar preparations and honey
07 1 1 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures thereof
22 1 1 Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits
08 0 1 Feeding stuff for animals
09 0 1 Miscellaneous edible products and preparations
11 0 1 Beverages
12 0 1 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures
29 0 1 Crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.s.
03 0 0 Fish, crustaceans, molluscs and aquatic invertebrates, and preparations thereof
21 0 0 Hides, skins and furskins, raw
23 0 0 Crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed)
24 0 0 Cork and wood
25 0 0 Pulp and waste paper
26 0 0 Textile fibres (other than wool tops and other combed wool) and their wastes
27 0 0 Crude fertilizers, other than those of Division 56, and crude minerals
28 0 0 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap
32 0 0 Coal, coke and briquettes
33 0 0 Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials
34 0 0 Gas, natural and manufactured
35 0 0 Electric current
41 0 0 Animal oils and fats
42 0 0 Fixed vegetable fats and oils, crude, refined or fractionated
43 0 0 Animal or vegetable fats and oils, processed; waxes and mixtures
51 0 0 Organic chemicals
52 0 0 Inorganic chemicals
53 0 0 Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials
54 0 0 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products
55 0 0 Essential oils and resinoids and perfume materials; toilet, polishing and cleansing preparations
56 0 0 Fertilizers (other than those of group 272)
57 0 0 Plastics in primary forms
58 0 0 Plastics in non-primary forms
59 0 0 Chemical materials and products, n.e.s.
61 0 0 Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s., and dressed furskins
62 0 0 Rubber manufactures, n.e.s.
63 0 0 Cork and wood manufactures (excluding furniture)
64 0 0 Paper, paperboard and articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard
65 0 0 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, n.e.s., and related products
66 0 0 Non-metallic mineral manufactures, n.e.s.
67 0 0 Iron and steel
68 0 0 Non-ferrous metals
69 0 0 Manufactures of metals, n.e.s.
71 0 0 Power-generating machinery and equipment
72 0 0 Machinery specialized for particular industries
73 0 0 Metalworking machinery
74 0 0 General industrial machinery and equipment, n.e.s., and machine parts, n.e.s.
75 0 0 Office machines and automatic data-processing machines
76 0 0 Telecommunications and sound-recording and reproducing apparatus and equipment
77 0 0 Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, n.e.s., and electrical parts thereof
78 0 0 Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles)
79 0 0 Other transport equipment
81 0 0 Prefabricated buildings; sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting fixtures and fittings, n.e.s.
82 0 0 Furniture and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuff
83 0 0 Travel goods, handbags and similar containers
84 0 0 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories
85 0 0 Footwear
87 0 0 Professional, scientific and controlling instruments and apparatus, n.e.s.
88 0 0 Photographic apparatus, equipment and supplies and optical goods, n.e.s.; watches and clocks
89 0 0 Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s.
96 0 0 Coin (other than gold coin), not being legal tender
97 0 0 Gold, non-monetary (excluding gold ores and concentrates)
Note: Agricultural products are defined based on Standard International Trade Classification, Revision 4; United
Nations Statistics Division
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